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[Please note: This is a work in progress.] 
 
Selecting Investment Arbitrators: Reconciling Party Autonomy and the 
International Rule of Law 
James Gerard Devaney* 
 
Abstract: 
This paper focuses on one particular issue which has arisen in the course of the ongoing debate on 
the reform of investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS), namely that of the appointment of 
arbitrators. Taking as its starting point that there now exists tentative consensus that the present 
system for the appointment of arbitrators either causes or exacerbates certain problematic aspects 
of the current ISDS system, the paper explores one option for reform, namely the introduction of an 
independent panel for the selection of investment arbitrators. In doing so, it is argued that a shift in 
the normative basis of the rules governing appointments is required in order to accommodate the 
principles of party autonomy and the international rule of law. Such reform, while not completely 
removing the initiative that parties presently enjoy, is the most efficient way to introduce rule of law 
considerations such as a measure of judicial independence into the current appointments system. 
This, it is argued, would in turn help to address some of the problematic features of the 
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With the multilateral debate on reform of the current system of investor-State dispute settlement 
(ISDS) in full swing,1 a broad consensus seems to be emerging around a certain number of issues. 
Participants in the multilateral process have reached tentative agreement that some kind of reform 
is necessary2 with regard to concerns over, inter alia, the repeat appointment of arbitrators,3 
‘double-hatting’4 and a lack of diversity among those who act as arbitrators.5 The focus of the 
present paper is one particular issue which has arisen in the course of discussions to date, namely 
that of the process of appointment of arbitrators in ISDS. Concerns have been expressed that, while 
parties cherish the control that they have in the appointment process, the current way that this is 
managed is either causing or exacerbating problematic aspects of the current ISDS system, 
contributing to its much-discussed ‘legitimacy crisis’.6 
This paper does not seek to re-tread old ground regarding whether well-known criticisms of the 
current system of ISDS are warranted. Much has been written elsewhere,7 and there is little value in 
regurgitating such debates here. Rather, this paper takes as its starting point that participants in 
the current ISDS system accept that there exist certain problematic issues surrounding the 
appointment of arbitrators, related mainly to independence, impartiality and lack of 
representativeness, which require attention. The paper also assumes that, at least in the 
foreseeable future, there will not be sufficiently widespread agreement for the immediate creation 
                                                        
1 See the latest Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the work of its 
thirty-seventh session (New York, 1-5 April 2019) 9 April 2019, A/CN.9/970. At this session the Secretariat was 
requested to undertake preparatory work on a number of topics including, inter alia, the ‘[s]election and 
appointment of arbitrators’, see https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/acn9_970_as_sub_1.pdf.  
2 See generally Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the work of its 
thirty-sixth session (Vienna, 29 October – 2 November 2018) 9 November 2018, A/CN.9/964. 
3 See PluriCourts Investment Treaty and Arbitration Database (PITAD), available at: https://pitad.org – data 
shows that each year only 11% of arbitral appointments are first time appointments, see also Sergio Puig, 
‘Social Capital in the Arbitration Market’ European Journal of International Law (2014), 25(2), 387; Malcolm 
Langford, Daniel Behn and Runar Lie, ‘The Revolving Door in International Investment Arbitration’, Journal of 
International Economic Law 20, (2017) 301-331. 
4 Langford, Behn and Lie, ibid, have shown that 47% of cases involve at least one arbitrator acting in another 
case; see also; Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Martin Dietrich Brauch, ‘Is “Moonlighting” a Problem? The 
Role of ICJ Judges in ISDS’ IISD Commentary (2017) and Daniel Behn, Runar Lie, ‘The Ethics and Empirics of 
Double Hatting’ ESIL Reflection, Vol. 6, Issue 7, 24 July 2017. 
5 Sergio Puig, supra note 3; Joost Pauwelyn, ‘The Rule of Law Without the Rule of Lawyers? Why Investment 
Arbitrators are from Mars, Trade Adjudicators from Venus’, American Journal of International Law Vol. 109, 4, 
(2015) 760-805. 
6 See, for instance, Jose E. Alvarez et al (eds), The Evolving International Investment Regime (OUP 2011), Claire 
Balchin et al (eds), The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration (Kluwer 2010), Susan D. Franck, ‘The Legitimacy 
Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions’ 
Fordham Law Review, 73, (2005) 1521. 
7 See, for example, Malcolm Langford & Daniel Behn, ‘Managing Backlash: The Evolving Investment Treaty 
Arbitrator?’ European Journal of International Law, Vol. 29, 2, (2018) 551-580; Langford, Behn and Lie, supra 
note 3; Anthea Roberts, ‘UNCITRAL and ISDS Reforms: Moving to Reform Options … the Politics’, EJIL: Talk! 
November 8, 2018, International Bar Association, ‘Consistency, efficiency and transparency in investment 
treaty arbitration’, A report by the IBA Arbitration Subcommittee on Investment Treaty Arbitration, November 
2018, Freya Baetens, ‘The European Union’s Proposed Investment Court System: Addressing Criticisms of 
Investor-State Arbitration While Raising New Challenges’ 43 Legal Issues of Economic Integration (2016) 367, 
Piero Bernardini, ‘Reforming Investor–State Dispute Settlement: The Need to Balance Both Parties’ Interests’ 
32 ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal (2017) 38, Charles N Brower and Stephan W Schill, ‘Is 
Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International Investment Law?’ 9 Chicago Journal of 
International Law (2009) 471, Katharina Diel-Gligor, Towards Consistency in International Investment 
Jurisprudence: A Preliminary Ruling System for ICSID Arbitration (Brill 2017).  
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of a Multilateral Investment Court (MIC) or Appellate Body (AB),8 and as such examines the practical 
and normative case for one particular alternative option for reform. 
In doing so, it will be argued that a shift in the normative basis of the appointments system is 
required. To elaborate, the current rules on the appointment of arbitrators are undergirded by the 
principle of party autonomy which privileges the preferences of parties above all else in the 
process. However, this normative basis, in large part, is the source of certain problematic aspects 
of the current system of appointment of arbitrators in ISDS. The paper argues that the nature of 
international investment arbitration requires that rule of law considerations also be taken into 
account. 
The best way to accommodate the principles at play in the current system, namely party autonomy 
and the international rule of law, is through the introduction of an independent selection panel for 
investment arbitrators. Such a body, whilst not completely removing the initiative that parties 
currently have to put individuals forward as their candidate to become an arbitrator, would be the 
most efficient way to introduce rule of law considerations such as a measure of judicial 
independence into the current appointments system in ISDS, which would in turn help to 
ameliorate some of the problematic features of the current appointments system. 
2. The Current Appointments Practice in ISDS 
The standard rules which govern the appointment of arbitrators at present are based squarely on 
the principle of party autonomy.9 Mirroring international investment law more generally, with its 
decentralized nature and range of dispute settlement fora and procedural rules, there is no one 
common process for the appointment of arbitrators by parties. Rather, the exact process for the 
selection and appointment of arbitrators will depend on the treaty or contract provisions 
indicating the preferred or default fora.10 But in the vast majority of cases it is the parties 
themselves who select the arbitrators for the settlement of an investment dispute in which they 
are involved. 
Under both ICSID and UNCITRAL rules, parties typically each appoint one arbitrator to form a three-
member tribunal. The co-arbitrators then (under the UNCITRAL rules11) appoint the third arbitrator 
or (under the ICSID rules12) the parties themselves do so by mutual agreement. Not only do parties 
                                                        
8 See most recently the Submission of the European Union and its Member States to UNCITRAL Working Group 
III, 18 January 2019, ‘Establishing a Standing Mechanism for the Settlement of International Investment 
Disputes’, available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/january/tradoc_157631.pdf. See more 
generally the work of the European Commission at; http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index. 
cfm?id=1608. See also Rob Howse, ‘Designing a Multilateral Investment Court: Issues and Options’ 36 Yearbook 
of European Law (2017) 209, Michele Potestà, ‘Investment Arbitration, Challenges And Prospects For The 
Establishment Of A Multilateral Investment Court: Quo Vadis Enforcement?’ Austrian Yearbook on International 
Arbitration 2018 (2018). 
9 ICSID Convention, Articles 36-40; ICSID Arbitration Rules, Rules 1-4; 2010 UNCITRAL Rules, Articles 7-10; 2012 
ICC Rules, Articles 11-13; 2012 PCA Arbitration Rules, Articles 8–13; AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, Rules 11-
16. 
10 Note by the Secretariat, ‘Arbitrators and decision makers: appointment mechanisms and related issues’, 30 
August 2018, A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.152, para 5. 
11 Article 9(1) UNCITRAL Rules. 
12  Article 37(2)(b) ICSID Rules; Christoph H. Schreuer, Loretta Malintoppi, August Reinisch & Anthony 
Sinclair, Articles 37, 38 and 39 – Composition of Tribunal, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2nd ed.), 
Cambridge University Press, p. 475 (2009) see further ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal, Vol. 25, 
No. 2 – Special Focus Issue on Appointing Arbitrators (2010). 
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have the ability to appoint (at least one) arbitrator, they can do so for whatever reasons they deem 
most appropriate. The factors that parties take into account when considering which individual to 
appoint as ‘their’ arbitrator need not be set out in any transparent form, or in fact given at all.13  
Admittedly, things are different at the annulment stage of proceedings in the ICSID context, where 
parties have no say in the constitution of the Annulment Committee. Instead, under the certain 
(limited) circumstances in which annulment can be sought under Article 52 of the Washington 
Convention, ‘the Chairman shall forthwith appoint from the Panel of Arbitrators an ad 
hoc Committee of three persons.’ 14  Likewise, the monopoly of parties over the selection of 
arbitrators is circumscribed in the minority of cases in which Appointing Authorities may play a 
role. 15 Appointing Authorities are provided for under both the ICSID16 and UNCITRAL Rules,17 and 
typically involve the use of lists to appoint an arbitrator where the parties are unable to do so.  
Nevertheless, in the vast majority of cases in practice (leaving aside for the moment more recent 
comprehensive trade and investment agreements which envisage a different appointments system 
involving the use of a list procedure), under the traditional ISDS approach party autonomy is very 
much the guiding principle. This system necessarily elevates the importance of the position of the 
presiding arbitrator who will bear the burden of deciding the case one way or another in the 
absence of agreement among the other arbitrators, whether appointed jointly by the parties or in 
some other manner.18 The importance of the presiding arbitrator in this respect can hardly be 
exaggerated, and is why it is suggested from time to time that the existence of this arbitrator is 
sufficient to ensure the independence of the tribunal as a whole.19 For the purposes of this paper, 
however, it suffices to note that the fact the presiding arbitrator is not appointed by the parties in 
the same way that the other arbitrators has not prevented the formation of the general consensus 
among users of the system relating to a ‘possible lack of independence and impartiality of decision 
makers, or of the perception thereof’.20 With this in mind, it is to such problematic aspects of the 
current appointments system that we now turn our attention.  
  
                                                        
13 Secretariat Note on Appointments, supra note 10, para 7. 
14 See Article 52(3) ICSID Convention; see also; https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/process/Post-Award-
Remedies-Convention-Arbitration.aspx.  
15 See the figures set out in Note by the Secretariat, ‘Submissions from International Intergovernmental 
Organizations and additional information: appointment of arbitrators’, 19 February 2018, A/CN.9/WG.III/ 
WP.146, at paras 11 and 44. 
16 For a description of the procedure at ICSID and UNCITRAL see; Secretariat Note, ibid, paras 30-40 and 46-56 
respectively. 
17 Ibid.  
18 See generally Chiara Giorgetti, The Arbitral Tribunal: Selection and Replacement of Arbitrators, Litigating 
International Investment Disputes: A Practitioner’s Guide (Chiara Giorgetti ed.), Brill / Nijhoff, pp. 145-172 
(2014); David Branson, Sympathetic Party-Appointed Arbitrators: Sophisticated Strangers and Governments 
Demand Them, pp. 367-393.  
19 Joseph M. Matthews, ‘Difficult Transitions Do Not Always Require Major Adjustment - It’s Not Time to 
Abandon Party-Nominated Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration’, ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law 
Journal, Vol. 25, No. 2 – Special Focus Issue on Appointing Arbitrators (2010) 363. 
20 Report of Working Group III, 36th Session, supra note 2, para 66, on ‘perception’ c.f. Susan D. Franck, 
‘Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration’ Harvard International Law Journal (2009) 50(2) 
435 and Michael Waibel and Yanhui Wu, ‘Are Arbitrators Political? Evidence from International Investment 
Arbitration’ (2017) Working Paper.  
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3. Problematic Aspects of the Current Appointments Practice in ISDS 
Criticisms of the current system of ISDS relating to a possible lack of independence and 
impartiality of decision-makers, or at the very least a perception of the system as such, which have 
been the subject of significant scholarly attention in recent times,21 as well as being acknowledged 
at the multilateral level, 22 are by now well-known. What is important to emphasise at this juncture 
is the extent to which the traditional party-driven approach to appointments in the context of ISDS 
contributes to, or exacerbates to some extent, these criticisms.  
Issues of independence and impartiality arise (at least partly) as a result of the practices of repeat 
appointments23 and double-hatting,24 facilitated by the current appointments practice which grants 
almost total discretion to the parties as to who to put forward as ‘their’ arbitrator. In the simplest 
of terms, a party using its prerogative to repeatedly appoint the same individual as an arbitrator or 
counsel in cases in which it is involved is said to engender a dangerous relationship of co-
dependency which is detrimental to that individual’s independence and impartiality in the 
subsequent proceedings. Likewise, the practice of individuals fluidly moving between different 
roles in the arbitral process is regularly singled out as being potentially problematic in this 
context. Sands, one of the most prominent voices against such practices concisely encapsulates 
the concern that exists in relation to this issue: 
‘[I]t is possible to recognise the difficulty that may arise if a lawyer spends a morning 
drafting an arbitral award that addresses a contentious legal issue, and then in the 
afternoon as counsel in a different case drafts a pleading making arguments on the same 
legal issue. Can that lawyer, while acting as arbitrator, cut herself off entirely from her 
simultaneous role as counsel? The issue is not whether she thinks it can be done, but 
whether a reasonable observer would so conclude. Speaking for myself, I find it difficult to 
imagine that I could do so without, in some way, potentially being seen to run the risk of 
allowing myself to be influenced, however subconsciously.’25 
Furthermore, and again facilitated by the current appointments process, a lack of diversity among 
decision-makers is said to undermine ISDS.26 In the context of recent multilateral discussions 
under the auspices of UNCITRAL this lack of diversity, in terms of gender and geographical 
distribution 27  (but also broader considerations such as age, ethnicity, language and legal 
background) was generally seen by States as being a weakness in the current system which 
prevents better understanding of the policy considerations of States, local laws and international 
                                                        
21 See references above at footnote 7. 
22 Draft Report, 6 November 2018, Secretariat Note on Appointments, supra note 10, para 37. 
23 See references above at footnote 3. 
24 See references above at footnote 4. 
25 Phillipe Sands, ‘International Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the International Judge’, 44 
Harvard International Law Journal 271 (2003), 31-32. 
26 Report of Working Group III, 36th Session, supra note 2, para 91 et seq. 
27 Studies have shown that 74% of arbitrators are from Western States, see Malcolm Langford, Daniel Behn and 
Runar Lie, supra note 3, 301-332; see also UNCTAD, ‘World Investment Report 2018: Investment and New 
Industrial Policies (UN 2018)’, Ksenia Polonskaya, ‘Diversity in the Investor-State Arbitration: Intersectionality 
Must Be Part of the Conversation’ Melbourne Journal of International Law (2018) 9, 296, Gabrielle Kaufmann-
Kohler and Michele Potestà, ‘The Composition of a Multilateral Investment Court and of an Appeal Mechanism 
for Investment Awards’ CIDS Supplemental Report (2017). 
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law more generally.28 In particular, the record of female representation on arbitral tribunals has 
been described by one prominent commentator as ‘remarkably poor’ and is a factor in and of itself 
which justifies reform of the current appointment system.29  
The operation of the principle of party autonomy, coupled with parties’ preference for ‘expertise 
and experience’ as they seek to maximise their chances of success in any dispute,30 is a direct 
cause of concerns regarding independence, impartiality, and representativeness. That said, 
wresting any modicum of parties’ ability to choose is likely to meet fierce resistance. As such, in the 
following sections reform is proposed which attempts to strike a balance between allowing parties 
input in, and ownership of, the appointments process (something which has been described as ‘an 
element in ensuring a successful outcome of the dispute’31) whilst also addressing valid concerns 
regarding independence, impartiality and representativeness.32 
4. The Rule of Law and an Independent Panel for the Scrutiny of Investment Arbitrators (IPSIA) 
‘Just as the state of the rule of law is of critical importance to the wellbeing of a nation, so in 
the world today is the health of the international rule of law critical to the wellbeing of the 
global society in which we live. Both nationally and internationally the quality of the rule of 
law is in turn dependent upon the quality of the judiciary who have the responsibility of 
upholding the rule of law. Yet very little attention has been given by academics or others as 
to how international judges are nominated and appointed, though this obviously would have 
an immense influence on the quality of the decisions of the courts and tribunals to which 
they are appointed.’33 
The previous sections have shown that the current rules that govern the appointment of arbitrators 
in investment arbitration are governed by the principle of party autonomy. However, this normative 
basis for the current rules, it is argued, is insufficient and ultimately what creates, or at least 
exacerbates, certain problematic aspects of ISDS. While the principle of party autonomy may be fit 
to govern appointments in the context of international commercial arbitration, it is inappropriate 
by itself in the context of international investment law. 34  Investment arbitration involves 
                                                        
28 Report of Working Group III, 36th Session, supra note 2, para 92; see also Secretariat Note on Appointments, 
supra note 10, para 20. See further, Anthea Roberts, Is International Law International? (OUP 2017). 
29 Successive studies have shown that only somewhere between 3 and 10% of ICSID arbitrators are female: Gus 
Van Harten, ‘The (Lack of) Women Arbitrators in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2011), All Papers, Paper 3, 
available at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/all_papers/34 found 3%; Susan D. Franck, ‘Empirically 
Evaluating Claims about Investment Treaty Arbitration’, North Carolina Law Review (2007), 86(1) 1 found 3%, 
Lucy Greenwood and C. Mark Baker, ‘Is the Balance Getting Better? An Update on the Issue of Gender 
Diversity’, Arbitration International (2015) 31(3), 413 found 5.63%, Sergio Puig, supra note 3, found 7%; see also 
ISDS Academic Forum Working Group 7 Paper, ‘Empirical Perspectives on Investment Arbitration: What Do We 
Know? Does it Matter?’, Malcolm Langford, Daniel Behn and Laura Létourneau-Tremblay, 15 March 2019. See 
most recently: Taylor St. John, Daniel Behn, Malcolm Langford, and Runar Lie, ‘Glass Ceilings and Arbitral 
Dealings: Gender and Investment Arbitration’ (2018) PluriCourts Working Paper. 
30 Or what St. John, Behn, Langford and Lie, ibid, term the ‘prior experience norm’; see also Report of Working 
Group III, 36th Session, supra note 2, para 93. 
31 Report of Working Group III, 36th Session, ibid, para 95. 
32 Report of Working Group III, 36th Session, ibid, para 98. 
33 Lord Woolf, Foreword, in MacKenzie et al (eds) Selecting International Judges (OUP 2010). 
34 Martin Loughlin, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law’ European Journal 
of International Law, 17(1), (2006) 121, 139–45; Gus Van Harten, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural 
Fairness, and the Rule of Law’ in S. Schill, International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law, (OUP 
2010) at 15. 
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subjecting matters of public law and public policy to international review by an arbitral tribunal.35 
Not only that, should the arbitral tribunal find that the public policy enacted by a sovereign State 
contravened its international obligations, it may issue a binding award against that State, the 
principal remedy being monetary compensation which is, in the simplest of terms, public money.36  
Accordingly, it is argued that the private or commercial principle of party autonomy is not 
sufficient to govern the process of the appointment of arbitrators in international investment 
arbitration which, although not exclusively public,37 is at the very least a hybrid of public and 
private in nature.38 Investment arbitration may be modelled on commercial arbitration, but today it 
is ‘in fact, fundamentally different from international commercial arbitration, despite the use in 
both proceedings of common principles and concepts.’39 Consequently, in light of its hybrid nature, 
the international rule of law must also play a role in international investment arbitration, including 
in the appointment of arbitrators.40  
Space restrictions prevent extensive consideration of the principle of the rule of law, its 
application at the international level in general, as well as its relevance for international 
investment arbitration more specifically. However, certain assumptions can be made here without 
fear of contradiction. First of all, the rule of law, although developed in the domestic legal context, 
applies to the international legal order.41 While the rule of law may play a different role at the 
                                                        
35 Eric De Brabandere, Investment Treaty Arbitration as Public International Law, (CUP 2014); Van Harten, ibid, at 
5-7, 15; William Burke-White, ‘The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability under BITs and the Legitimacy of the 
ICSID System’ Asian Journal of WTO and International Health Law and Policy (2008) 199. 
36 Van Harten, ibid, at 6, 7, 15; Wiliam Burke-White, ‘The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability under BITs and 
the Legitimacy of the ICSID System’ Asian Journal of WTO and International Health Law and Policy (2008) 199. 
On the spending of public money in international investment and commercial arbitration see Gary B. Born 
‘Confidentiality in an Age of Transparency: Challenges for Investment Arbitrators’ in Catherine A. Rogers and 
Roger P Alford, The Future of Investment Arbitration (OUP 2009). 
37 On this point, see the excellent exploration of the public or private nature of the investment treaty 
arbitration regime in, Jose E. Alvarez, ‘Is Investor-State Arbitration “Public”?’ 7 Journal of International Dispute 
Settlement (2016), 534-574, Anthea Roberts, ‘Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment 
Treaty System’ 107 American Journal of International Law (2013) 45, Jose E. Alvarez, ‘‘‘Beware: Boundary 
Crossings” – A Critical Appraisal of Public Law Approaches to International Investment Law’ 17 The Journal of 
World Investment and Trade (2016) 171-228. 
38 Alvarez, ‘Is Investor-State Arbitration “Public”?’, ibid, see also Anthea Roberts, ‘State-to-State Investment 
Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of Interdependent Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority’ 55 Harvard 
International Law Journal (2014) 1, Zachary Douglas, ‘The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitrations’ 
74 British Yearbook of International Law (2003) 151, Anthea Roberts ‘Triangular Treaties: The Extent and Limits 
of Investment Treaty Rights’ 56(2) Harvard International Law Journal (2015) 353, or for an even more forceful 
defence of the public nature of investment treaty arbitration see Eric De Brabandere, supra note 31 at 5, 
Stephan W. Schill, ‘Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological 
Foundations of a New Public Law Approach’ 52 Virginia Journal of International Law (2011) 57. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Van Harten, supra note 34, at 4. Similarly, Robert McCorquodale, ‘Defining the International Rule of Law: 
Defying Gravity?’ International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2016) Vol. 65, at 297 lists ‘the settlement of 
disputes before an independent legal body’ as one of the ‘objective[s] of the international rule of law’. What is 
relevant for our present purposes in the context of this paper, is the procedural and institutional aspects of 
the rule of law, rather than the substantive aspects of the rule of law. This should be contrasted with 
international investment scholarship which rather considers rule of law issues from a substantive or thick 
point of view, for instance considering the effect that the FET standard could have in improving the quality of 
the rule of law at the national level; see, for an excellent example, Velimir Živković, ‘International Rule of Law 
through International Investment Law – Strengths, Challenges and Opportunities’, KFG Working Paper Series, 
No. 16, May 2018. 
41 Nicholas W. Barber, ‘The Rechtsstaat and the Rule of Law’ 53 University of Toronto Law Journal (2003) 443, 
452; James Crawford, International Law and the Rule of Law (2003) Adelaide Law Review, 3, page 11, Crawford 
argues that, at least to the extent that international law ‘approximate[s] a system of public order between 
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international level (not protecting the individual from the power of the State, but protecting ‘the 
interests of the parties involved as well as the legitimacy of the arbitration process as a whole’42), 
the remarkably broad acceptance of this principle (despite its so-called ‘conceptual emptiness’43) 
is not only important in and of itself, but rather also provides the justification for the inductive task 
of attempting to identify its conceptual content.44 By way of illustration, the international rule of 
law enjoys the near universal support of States, 45 and is routinely referenced by the United Nations 
Security Council.46 
Secondly, a central component of the rule of law, which applies at the international level, is judicial 
independence. From Dicey47 to Raz48 and Hayek49, all of those writing about the rule of law envisage 
some form of judicial independence component. At the international level, too, judicial 
independence is recognised in a wide range of contexts.50 As one commentator has put it, the 
international rule of law is ‘widely regarded to include at the procedural level the requirement…of 
a decision by an independent and impartial decision-maker.’51 Obviously, at the international level, 
the rule of law does not require one single court to settle disputes of all kinds, but rather ‘requires 
that a dispute can be settled before an independent body, which neither needs to be a court (so 
called) nor by one body with overarching jurisdiction over all matters.’52 While nomenclature may 
                                                                                                                                                                             
States as legal orders in their own right, or to the extent that it performs tasks of adjudication, assessment or 
review of domestic decision-making in areas or matters in which international law itself prescribes 
compliance with the rule of law’, the rule of law and its attendant requirements must be observed. This is 
clearly the case for international investment law, which operates both as a system of public order between 
States and also involves a certain element of assessment or review of domestic decision-making in areas 
where international law prescribes compliance with the rule of law. 
42 Van Harten, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness…’ at 14; Brian Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: 
History, Politics, Theory (2004) 133-5. 
43 Crawford, supra note 37, at 11; Sir Arthur Watts, ‘The International Rule of Law’ (1993), The International Rule 
of Law, German Yearbook of International Law, 15. 
44 Živković, supra note 40. 
45 See Declaration on Principles of International Law Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UN GA Resolution 2625 (XXV) (1970) emphasising the 
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448 (IX-0/79), Arts 5, 18, 25; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Arts 36(9)(a), 39(1), 40(2) and (3). 
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not be important, the act of judicial or arbitral decision-making is, carrying with it ‘a very high 
expectation of procedural fairness’, including judicial independence.53  
But what standard of judicial independence is applicable in the context of international investment 
arbitration? Is it the same standard of judicial independence that applies to domestic courts or 
permanent international courts such as the International Court of Justice? The answer to this 
question is clearly no. In fact, the degree of judicial independence required by the rule of law in 
each context is inherently variable. 54  Accordingly, whilst parties’ exclusive control over the 
appointments process may not be appropriate, complete renunciation of this prerogative is not 
necessary either. This most likely requires further elaboration. 
That under the current ISDS system arbitrators are appointed by parties to the dispute underlies 
the (understandable) general perception that party-appointed arbitrators are somehow less 
independent and impartial than judges appointed through some other process to permanent 
courts.55 The role of arbitrators in investment arbitration, however, is not the same as that of 
judges on a permanent court, and as such it should not be surprising that their appointment 
processes are also different. 56 This too likely means that judicial standards of independence and 
impartiality (such as, for example, the Burgh House Principles which include, inter alia, security of 
tenure, and prohibitions on extra-judicial activity57) are not currently suited to the context of 
investment arbitration. 
The institution of party-appointed arbitrators is a ‘consensual deviation from the ordinary norms 
governing the operation of the international adjudicatory mechanisms…[which] represents a trade-
off between two competing sets of values and interests…’ – namely party autonomy and judicial 
independence.58 Nevertheless, an appropriate balance can be found between these principles by 
amending the current rules in order to create an independent panel for the scrutiny of investment 
arbitrators, which, while leaving the initiative as to arbitral appointments with the parties (and as 
such preserving the principle of party autonomy) could also allow for other (international rule of 
law) considerations to be injected into the process.  
The exact standard of independence against which candidates are scrutinised is not one which 
should be imposed from above by the drafters of IPSIA’s constitutive instrument, but rather should 
be one which is developed by IPSIA itself throughout the course of its operation, whether that be in 
the form of a general statement as to the operation of the tribunal as was the case with the Article 
                                                        
53  Van Harten, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness…’ at 14; Chittharanjan Amerasinghe, 
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473. 
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255 Panel,59 or through the reasoned decisions in individual cases over time. The development of 
an appropriate standard of judicial independence is something which has been undertaken 
recently in the 2019 Opinion of the Court of Justice of the European Union regarding the 
compatibility of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the European 
Union and Canada.60 In this case, a number of EU Member States including Belgium had called into 
question whether the dispute settlement mechanism envisioned in Section F of Chapter Eight of 
CETA was, inter alia, compliant with the required standard of judicial independence applicable in 
the EU legal order.  
Judicial independence in this context finds expression in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union which is binding upon the European Union,61 but which is not defined 
in a particularly detailed manner, providing only the right to an ‘independent and impartial 
tribunal previously established by law’. As such, the CJEU was tasked with evaluating the proposed 
dispute settlement mechanism under CETA to assess whether or not the standard of judicial 
independence had been met, and in doing so had to flesh out exactly what judicial independence 
means in this context. In doing so, the CJEU in particular highlighted the ‘hybrid’ nature of the CETA 
Tribunal and Appellate Body, having characteristics of judicial bodies as well as ‘a number of 
elements that continue to be based on traditional arbitration mechanisms in relation to 
investments’62 as not being determinative. Rather, the CJEU enumerated a number of factors which 
it said counted in favour of the parties having created an ‘independent, impartial and permanent’ 
investment tribunal system as they had explicitly intended, including Articles 8.27, 8.27.7 and 8.28.5 
which provide for; the establishment of a permanent tribunal of 15 members, divisions of which will 
hear cases on a rotation basis, ensuring that the composition of the divisions is random and 
unpredictable and the same random allocation of individuals for the Appellate Tribunal 
respectively.63  
The CJEU divided the requirement of judicial independence into two separate elements, namely 
external and internal. External independence, according to the CJEU, ‘presupposes that the body 
concerned exercises its functions wholly autonomously, without being subject to any hierarchical 
constraint or subordinated to any other body and without taking orders or instructions from any 
sources whatsoever, thus being protected against external interventions or pressure liable to 
impair the independent judgment of its members and to influence their decisions.’64 To this end, 
the judges highlighted the importance of a number of factors which protect this external 
independence, including protections against removal, and a level of remuneration commensurate 
to the importance of the task undertaken.65  
                                                        
59 Third Activity Report of the Panel provided for by Article 255 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
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Internal independence, on the other hand, the CJEU links to impartiality and ‘seeks to ensure that 
an equal distance is maintained from the parties to the proceedings and their respective interests 
with regard to the subject matter of those proceedings’.66 In achieving internal independence the 
judges emphasised the importance of ‘objectivity and the absence of any interest in the outcome 
of the proceedings apart from the strict application of the rule of law.’67 Having defined both the 
internal and external elements of judicial independence, the CJEU then expounded upon the 
implications of their operation, stating that: 
Those guarantees of independence and impartiality require rules, particularly as regards the 
composition of the body and the appointment, length of service and grounds for abstention, 
rejection and dismissal of its members, in order to dispel any reasonable doubt in the minds 
of individuals as to the imperviousness of that body to external factors and its neutrality 
with respect to the interests before it.68 
Ultimately, the CJEU concluded that the agreement envisaged is compatible with the requirement 
of independence.69 While much could be written on the CJEU’s approach, and its attempts to 
accommodate its previous dicta in Achmea,70 what is relevant for our purposes is that the CJEU 
made an attempt to flesh out the applicable standard of independence for the purposes of Article 
47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. This is a notably high standard which the typical 
ISDS tribunal would most likely struggle to meet. How this definition will be received by States and 
how it will operate in practice remains to be seen, but the central point remains: no one-size-fits-
all definition of judicial independence can be developed. For each specific context an applicable 
standard should be developed and fully fleshed out. That said, IPSIA would not have to start 
completely from scratch, since it is suggested that the standard for independence and impartiality 
developed in the context of challenges to arbitrators provides significant useful guidance in this 
respect.71 
In making the case for the establishment of an independent panel for the selection of arbitrators, a 
number of constitutive elements must be considered, including (4.a) the creation and role given to 
the Panel, (4.b) appointment of members of the Panel, (4.c) the initiative to propose candidates, 
(4.d) the process for scrutinising candidates, and (4.e) the advisory nature of its work. 
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Convention and Rules’ in Chiara Giorgetti, Challenges and Recusals of Judges and Arbitrators in International 
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a) The Creation and Role of IPSIA 
There is nothing ground-breaking about any suggestion that a body other than the parties 
themselves could play some sort of role in the selection of arbitrators. Advisory bodies which 
scrutinise judicial appointments exist both at the international and domestic levels.72 Likewise, 
commentators in the past have advocated breaking parties’ stranglehold on the appointment of 
arbitrators. Perhaps the most prominent example in this regard is Jan Paulsson who, framing the 
issue in terms of ‘moral hazard’, 73 argued that the only real way to tackle this issue is to abolish the 
current practice of party-appointments altogether.74 However, Paulsson is by no means alone, with 
other commentators such as Sardinha arguing that the use of such a ‘detached institution or 
authority in overseeing the appointment process…[could] help reduce the broader systemic 
perception or outward appearance of bias from the vantage point of the opposing party, of the co-
arbitrators, and, particularly in highly contested investor-state disputes, of the public.’75 This same 
commentator has argued that resort to an independent institution ‘could prove to be particularly 
effective in curbing any unconscious bias on the part of arbitrators towards their appointing party, 
without resorting to the abolishment of the practice of party-appointed arbitrators altogether…’.76  
The precise role of IPSIA would need to be made clear to parties from the very beginning, and its 
objectives and working methods transparently set out. IPSIA’s role would be to scrutinise 
candidates and to facilitate that the highest-qualified individuals are appointed to investment 
arbitral tribunals. Undoubtedly, the introduction of such a body playing this role would mark a 
break with practice to date which has left parties’ discretion more or less unfettered in this regard. 
However, the creation of similar advisory bodies, such as the Article 255 Panel of the EU and 
Advisory Committee of the International Criminal Court, act as precedent for making such a break 
from long-running practice. 
To elaborate, the decision to establish the Article 255 Panel was the culmination of a longer 
process towards recognising that some objective criteria should be applied when assessing the 
suitability of judicial candidates, as well as subjecting them to some sort of scrutiny by an 
independent body. 77 The significance of the institution of this practice cannot be understated, 
given the decades-long practice that preceded the Article 255 Panel whereby individual Member 
States essentially exercised their sovereign right to put forward whichever candidates they liked 
with minimal scrutiny (which led to a situation in which no candidate for the Court of Justice was 
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ever rejected, as far as we know). 78  The situation was broadly similar with regard to the 
establishment of the Advisory Panel in the context of the ECHR in 2010.79 As such, it could be said 
that we can observe a similar normative shift from party autonomy to a greater emphasis on the 
rule of law component of judicial independence in these contexts. These examples also illustrate 
that the introduction of such mechanisms is far from being beyond the realms of possibility.  
An independent panel for the scrutiny of investment arbitrators could be introduced in a number 
of ways, including: amendment of existing investment agreements, incorporation in new 
investment agreements, amendment of the various procedural rules such as the ICSID Arbitration 
Rules, and an opt-in Mauritius Convention type mechanism.80 It is suggested that the latter may be 
the most straightforward mechanism for the introduction of IPSIA81 and that it could to a large 
extent replicate the best practice of existing advisory bodies such as the 255 Panel and the 
Advisory Committee of the ICC. 
In very simple terms this would mean that parties to an investment dispute could first of all decide 
upon an individual that they wish to put forward as their candidate, before the IPSIA would 
scrutinise and present a recommendation on the individual’s suitability. The parties could then 
take this recommendation into account before appointments were made in the usual manner 
(whether that be jointly by the parties, or through an Appointing Authority or otherwise).82 Whilst 
IPSIA’s recommendation would be non-binding, practice of the other advisory bodies shows us that 
in practice such recommendations can nevertheless have significant practical effect, an issue to 
which we will return at section 4.e. 
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b) Appointment of Members of the Panel 
IPSIA could consist of full-time members whose sole job it would be to scrutinise and provide 
recommendations on parties’ proposed candidates. The exact number of members required could 
be based on projections of the workload of the Panel.83 The obvious challenge in this regard would 
be finding suitable candidates who would be both available, as well as qualified (and sufficiently 
independent and impartial) to perform the role. Similarly challenging will be identifying exactly 
how members of the IPSIA could be appointed.  
In other contexts, such as with the Article 255 Panel or the Advisory Committee of the ICC, there 
exist representative or executive bodies through which Member States can exercise the function of 
appointing such individuals. The seven members of the Article 255 Panel are selected by the 
European Council, acting on the initiative of the President of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, from former members of the Court of Justice and General court, individuals who have been 
judges of national supreme courts, and lawyers of recognised competence. 84 One of the seven 
members is proposed by the European Union’s representative body, the European Parliament.  
Members of the Advisory Committee of the ICC, on the other hand, are ‘designated by the Assembly 
of States Parties by consensus on recommendation made by the Bureau of the Assembly also made 
by consensus…’ 85 In the absence of an obvious centralised body in the investment law context to 
perform this role, other alternatives would need to be explored. For instance, Members of the 
Panel could be appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice,86 in consultation 
with any other Appointing Authority or relevant non-State actor, in accordance with public and 
transparent criteria. 
In creating an advisory panel to scrutinise arbitral appointments in the context of ISDS, it would be 
absolutely essential that the Members of the body are appointed in a manner that ensures 
complete confidence in the panel. A lack of transparency in the appointment of members of both 
international87 and domestic advisory bodies has been cited as a consistent problem due to the 
fact that ‘eligibility rules for acceding to…judicial selection bodies are [often] notably vague’, and 
significant discretion is usually left to the executive in this regard.88 However, if parties were to be 
encouraged to relinquish the control they currently have over the appointments process and make 
use of this mechanism, it would be essential that clear and transparent selection criteria for its 
Members as well as transparency in the process itself were put in place.  
In this regard, it is suggested that lessons can be learned from those criteria utilised before the 
Article 255 Panel and ICC Advisory Committee. For instance, none of the relevant provisions of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) mention any factors which should be taken 
into account when selecting members of the Article 255 Panel such as geographic representation or 
gender. In contrast, the selection criteria for the selection of members of the ICC Advisory 
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Committee specifically require that the Committee reflect ‘the principal legal systems of the world 
and an equitable geographical representation, as well as a fair representation of both genders, 
based on the number of States Parties to the Rome Statute.’89 A similar formulation could be 
utilised with regard to the selection of members of IPSIA, as it is essential that public, transparent 
criteria are publicised and adhered to in order to not simply transplant the current problems with 
the transparency of the appointments in ISDS to IPSIA. 
c) The Initiative to Propose Candidates 
It is suggested that parties could retain the initiative in terms of proposing candidates for arbitral 
tribunals, whilst scrutiny of candidates’ qualifications, potential conflicts of interest, and 
representativeness is built in to the current system. Such a procedure could strike a balance 
between two the two (at times competing) principles outlined above, namely legitimate rule of law-
based concerns related to the current party-driven process for the appointment of arbitrators in 
ISDS, and the (perceived) benefits that parties see in retaining autonomy in this process.  
In international legal scholarship a debate has played out over whether parties should continue to 
enjoy sole control over the appointment of arbitrators. For instance, as mentioned above, Jan 
Paulsson has been the most prominent voice in support of ending a purely party-driven 
appointment process. Paulsson, who questions whether parties in fact enjoy a ‘fundamental right’ 
to name their own arbitrator,90 contests the logic of the commonly held view that ‘my nominee will 
help me win the case’,91 arguing that this mentality is nonsensical due to the fact that, by this logic, 
the party’s nominee is cancelled out by the other party’s nominee and as such the parties can only 
have mutual confidence in one member of the tribunal, if at all. Consequently, Paulsson argues 
that the only ‘decent’ solution is that arbitrators should be appointed by a neutral body.92 Such 
arguments, of course, stand in apparent opposition to the preference expressed by parties to 
retain control over the appointments process.93  
Tufte-Kristensen has examined this preference, pointing out that sociological studies suggest that 
the notion of control over the process is the primary reason that the current system of 
appointment continues to be perceived as attractive by parties.94 Other high-profile commentators 
have rejected any suggestion of reforming the current party-driven appointments system.95 Brower 
and Rosenberg, for example, have argued that the legitimacy and attractiveness of the current 
system of ISDS is inextricably linked with parties’ right (which has existed for ‘decades, even 
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University of London, ‘International Arbitration Survey: Current and Preferred Practices in the Arbitral Process’ 
(2012), 5. 
94 Johan Tufte-Kristensen, ‘The unilateral appointment of co-arbitrators’ Arbitration International (2016) 32, 
483, 495. 
95 For other supporters of party-appointed arbitrators see: Gary B Born, International Commercial Arbitration 
(Kluwer Law International 2014, 2nd Edition) 1807-808; Charles N Brower and Charles B Rosenberg, ‘The Death of 
the Two-Headed Nightingale’, Arbitration International 29 (2013) 7, 25; V V Veeder, ‘The Historical Keystone to 
International Arbitration: The Party-Appointed Arbitrator - From Miami to Geneva’, Proceedings of the Annual 
Meeting (American Society of International Law) 107 (2013) 387, 401. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3388903 




centuries’) to choose their own arbitrators.96 It is contended that party-appointed arbitrators are 
essentially self-policing in terms of impartiality due to the fact that, in the open market of 
appointments, they rely on being seen as credible for future work.97 As Mourre has written:  
‘[P]arties want to appoint arbitrators who will be listened [to] and respected within the 
tribunal. And parties know that the standing and reputation of experienced international 
arbitrators depend from their capacity to exercise independent judgment when deliberating 
with their colleagues. As a consequence, party-appointed arbitrators tend to be selected 
more for their reputation of impartiality and integrity than for their supposed willingness to 
support their appointing party’s thesis.’98 
Lawyers in the employ of parties typically expend significant energy scrutinising the records of 
candidates that they may put forward as their choice of arbitrator, including ‘the backgrounds of 
arbitrators, their relationship with the parties, published works and prior appointments before 
nominating them for arbitral appointments.’99 As such, the argument goes that the current system 
of party-appointment, whereby parties typically put forward ‘someone with the maximum 
predisposition towards my client, but with the minimum appearance of bias’,100 is the best means 
for the appointment of arbitrators due to the fact that ‘potential arbitrators effectively “stand for 
election” by parties every time a new case is brought.’101 
Given the strength of feeling on both sides of this debate that has been raging for more than a 
decade, it seems difficult to conclude that there is any sort of consensus as to whether the 
abolition of party-appointments would be wise, even if it were possible. Nevertheless, it is argued 
that a procedure could be envisaged for IPSIA which represents a good compromise. In allowing 
parties to maintain the right of initiative in terms of selecting their candidate, they would still feel 
ownership of the process, as well as retaining one of the most popular aspects of the current ISDS 
system. Simultaneously, doing so in the knowledge that parties’ proposed candidates would be 
subjected to interview and scrutiny against transparent criteria, informed by the international rule 
of law, practice suggests that positive reform could nevertheless be introduced into the system. 
Aware that an independent panel of experts would examine issues such as track record, possible 
bias and past publications, issues of repeat appointments or independence could be weeded out 
before they arise. The configuration of the IPSIA in this way could ensure that the ‘benefits of the 
current system, such as its flexibility and neutrality’ that stakeholders have emphasised they would 
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like to preserve,102 would be, whilst real, meaningful scrutiny of candidates in accordance with rule 
of law considerations is introduced. 
d) The Scrutiny of Candidates 
But how exactly would scrutiny of candidates work in practice, and against which criteria would 
they be assessed? In very basic terms, any process of scrutiny of candidates put forward by parties 
would necessarily require the submission of supporting documents to IPSIA. By way of illustration, 
the Advisory Committee of the ICC takes into account ‘written material submitted by the candidates 
in the form of statements of qualifications and curricula vitae.’103 A similar process can be easily 
envisioned for IPSIA, whereby it could consider parties’ justifications for putting forward the 
individual, the individual’s own motivations, their publications (academic or otherwise) and any 
other relevant information.104 In the case that IPSIA felt it lacked certain information, it could be 
endowed with the power to request information from the parties, although a binding power of 
subpoena finds no parallel in practice and is unlikely to find support. 105 
It would be essential that the criteria against which candidates are then assessed are made clear. 
In the context of the Article 255 Panel, whilst the formal operating rules do not explicitly lay out the 
criteria against which the Article 255 panel will assess candidates, and the provisions in the 
Treaties remain rather vague,106 the Panel itself has subsequently, through one of its Activity 
Reports made these criteria more explicit, stating that:  
‘[t]he panel’s assessment of these criteria is therefore made on the basis of six 
considerations: the candidate’s legal expertise; his or her professional experience; ability to 
perform the duties of a Judge; language skills; aptitude for working as part of a team in an 
international environment in which several legal systems are represented; finally, his or her 
impartiality and independence must of course be beyond doubt.’107 
In a broadly similar manner, the ICC Advisory Committee’s assessment is ‘based on the 
requirements of article 36, paragraphs 3 (a), (b) and (c), of the Rome Statute, (which require 
‘established competence in criminal law and procedure, and the necessary relevant experience, 
whether as a judge, prosecutor, advocate or in other similar capacity, in criminal proceedings’, ‘an 
excellent knowledge of and [fluency] in at least one of the working languages of the Court’ and 
capability to undertake full-time work for the full term.) It is suggested that a combination of these 
requirements, with the necessary modifications to ensure knowledge of both public international 
and investment law, could be drawn up in the context of IPSIA. 108 To reiterate, it is essential that an 
                                                        
102 Secretariat Note on Appointments, supra note 10, para 37, see also Report of Working Group III (Investor-
State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the work of its thirty-fifth session (New York, 25 June – 13 July 2018) 14 
May 2018, A/CN.9/935. 
103 Report of the Advisory Committee on Nomination of Judges on the work of its third meeting, New York, 8-17 
December 2014, ICC-ASP/13/22, Annex 1, 3. 
104 de Waele, supra note 77, 36, see Second Activity Report of the Panel provided for by Article 255 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union, Brussels, 26 December 2012, 5091/13, COUR 2 JUR 5, 9–10. 
105 de Waele, ibid. 
106 See Articles 253, 254 TFEU.  
107 Third Activity Report, supra note 59, 17. 
108 With regard to the applicable standard, see references at note 71. 
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explicit provision that IPSIA take into account gender balance and geographical representation be 
included in these criteria.109 
Leaving aside for now the applicable standard of independence that IPSIA ought to develop, which 
was discussed above at the beginning of Section 4, it is useful to dwell a little further on the exact 
role that IPSIA would play and to devote some words to considering the types of situations that it 
may encounter. In simple terms, we can expect the role of IPSIA would necessarily change in the 
course of assessing individual candidates before it against objective criteria. To elaborate, in 
relation to the proposed appointment of certain individuals, say, any of the ‘power brokers’ 
included in the top 25 of Puig’s work,110 for a run-of-the-mill investment dispute (if such a thing 
exists), there would be little need to examine whether such a candidate had the relevant legal 
expertise or practical experience. Such individuals would easily be able to demonstrate 
appropriate expertise and experience, and pressing the individual to substantiate their credentials 
in this regard would be a waste of IPSIA’s time. That said, for such individuals, who are regularly 
simultaneously involved in multiple disputes in one form or another, pertinent international rule of 
law questions could perhaps be asked with regard to that individual’s impartiality or 
independence. Would it be appropriate for that individual to act as an arbitrator in that case given 
that in the past they have worked with the firm representing one of the parties? More mundanely, 
is it appropriate for that particular individual to take on their 61st investment arbitration? How does 
that individual expect to schedule a hearing for this dispute, given their myriad other 
commitments? And further, could that individual really be expected to engage fully with this 
particular case, or would it perhaps be necessary to rely on a research assistant to draft 
documents on behalf of that individual?111 
In different circumstances, however, the role that IPSIA could play would potentially be very 
different. For instance, there may genuinely be cases in which the legal expertise or experience of 
an individual may be open to question. This may particularly be the case more often if calls to 
diversify the current pool of individuals routinely called upon to act as arbitrators are actually 
heeded. In such situations, IPSIA members could probe the individual’s knowledge of substantive 
aspects of investment or public international law in the same way that substantive aspects of EU 
law are probed before the Article 255 Committee. An individual’s experience in managing cases, 
too, (an undervalued skill to have in international dispute settlement) could also be further 
explored. Indeed much has been made of such skills before the Advisory Committee of the ICC, with 
regard to experience in handling different aspects of criminal trials.  
Practice highlights the importance of in-person interviews for the functioning of such advisory 
bodies. For instance, the Advisory Committee of the ICC has decided that ‘[t]he Committee’s 
consistent experience has been that the interviews with candidates have revealed important 
elements relating to how they fulfil the requirements of article 36 of the Rome Statute and to the 
relevance of their professional experience to the work of the Court, which were not detected in the 
written submissions.’112 Similar interviews are carried out in the context of the Article 255 process,113 
                                                        
109 A position which finds support in Negotiating Directives for a Convention Establishing a Multilateral Court 
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 20 March 2018, 12987/17. 
110 Puig, supra note 3 at 387. 
111 Malcolm Langford, Daniel Behn and Runar Lie, ‘Who Writes Arbitral Awards?’ (2018) PluriCourts Working 
Paper. 
112 Third Activity Report, supra note 59, D. 
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which inform deliberations (in private) before a reasoned recommendation is made to the Member 
State of the candidate in question.114 The positive or negative nature of this recommendation is 
kept confidential, again for fear of discouraging applicants or damaging the individual in question’s 
reputation.115 In contrast, the ICC Advisory Committee prepares ‘information and analysis, of a 
technical character, strictly on the suitability of the candidates’ which is then circulated to all 
States Parties and observers in sufficient time to allow for votes are cast at the Assembly of States 
Parties. The identities of the candidates and a short report on the Committee’s findings are also 
made publicly available in separate reports.116  
It is essential that transparency is ensured at every stage of the scrutiny process.117 For example, 
the identity of interviewees should be made public, and a public report given of the reasoned 
recommendation. Whilst the Article 255 Panel is in many ways a good example for how such an 
advisory body could operate, in practice it is less than transparent in its operation in several key 
areas. Controversially, the entire process through which candidates are interviewed takes place in 
private. Increased transparency has been mooted but so far resisted, the apparent justification 
being considerations related to the applicants’ privacy,118 and concerns that a public process would 
have a ‘chilling effect’ in the sense of dissuading certain individuals from putting themselves 
forward for the job.119  
In terms of timescale for this process, a 30-day turnaround could be a realistic target for IPSIA.120 
Looking again to a relevant comparator, data shows that between 2010 and 2013 the average 
amount of time for a candidate to be considered by the Article 255 Panel of the EU was just 64 days, 
with 30% of cases being concluded in less than 45 days.121 And in fact, it has been suggested that 
one factor in slowing up this process was indolence on the part of Member States.122 Indolence is 
not something that has been identified as a cause of delay in the context of investment arbitration 
(unlike requests for bifurcation and arbitrator challenges for example123) and as such there is no 
                                                                                                                                                                             
113 See Point 7 of Panel’s Operating Rules.  
114 Should it be necessary, the President of the Council may call on the president of the panel to elaborate on 
any aspect of the reasoned recommendation, Point 5 of the operating rules. 
115 de Waele, supra note 77, 38. 
116 See Report of the Bureau on the establishment of an Advisory Committee on nominations of judges of the 
International Criminal Court, New York, 12-21 December 2011, ICC-ASP/10/36, Annex, C. 12 which states 
‘Information and analysis presented by the Committee is to inform the decision-making of States Parties and 
is not in any way binding on them or on the Assembly of States Parties.’ See Report of the Bureau, supra note 
41.Annex, C. 12. 
117 Indeed, in this regard, States have already expressed Preliminary Views that selection criteria utilised by 
appointing authorities should be published by arbitral institutions as well as explanations for the selections 
they make (A/CN.9/935, para. 66). 
118 Final report of the Discussion Circle on the Court of Justice at the European Convention, Brussels, 25 March 
2003, CONV 636/03, Point 6. 
119 Alberto Alemanno, ‘How Transparent is Transparent Enough?’ in Michal Bobek, Selecting Europe’s Judges 
(OUP 2015), 211. 
120 This is the same time period within which ICSID seeks to complete the appointments process, see; 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/process/Selection-and-Appointment-of-Tribunal-Members-
Convention-Arbitration.aspx; Meg Kinnear, Appointment to Arbitral Tribunals at ICSID, ABA SIL International 
Arbitration Committee Newsletter, American Bar Association, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2013). 
121 Second Activity Report, supra note 104. 
122 de Waele, supra note 77, 36. 
123 See ISDS Academic Forum Working Group 7 Paper, supra note 24, at 21. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3388903 




reason to suggest that the introduction of the IPSIA procedure will necessarily lead to greater delay 
in the resolution of an investment dispute between two parties motivated to do so. 
e) The Advisory Nature of the Panel’s Work 
One of the key elements of any proposal to introduce scrutiny of arbitral candidates by an 
independent body in accordance with rule of law considerations is of course whether that body’s 
findings would bind the parties. It is suggested that, given the complete control that parties have 
over appointments at this point in time, it is unlikely that they would agree to put themselves at 
the mercy of an independent body that could constrain their discretion to appoint their arbitrators 
through a binding decision. Indeed, analogous advisory bodies at both the international and 
domestic levels almost exclusively issue recommendations rather than binding decisions.124 
For example, the recommendation of the 255 Panel is just that, a recommendation without binding 
force, and the Council does not formally have to follow the recommendation of the 255 Panel. In 
practice, however, this has not been how the system has operated. In fact, it has even been said 
that in reality the 255 Panel ‘holds a de facto veto power.’125 This setup, whereby the independent 
body tasked with scrutinising candidates for judicial office is formally advisory but practically 
respected is replicated in a number of domestic legal systems.126 
The 255 Panel has played an active role since its establishment. In the period between 2010 and 
2013 the Panel made unfavourable recommendations in relation to seven out of 67 candidates that 
it examined. Although the process remains confidential, the Panel has indicated that reasons for 
the negative assessment of a candidate in practice have included a lack of relevant professional 
experience127 and lack of relevant legal knowledge.128 The fact that none of the candidates who had 
been given an unfavourable opinion by the 255 Panel ever went on to become a judge underlines 
the practical power that it possesses. 129  
Similarly, at the ICC scrutiny has been conducted of, and non-binding recommendations made 
regarding,130 a number of judges since its first meeting in 2013. At its second meeting, the first time 
that there had been judicial elections since its establishment, the Advisory Committee was tasked 
with assessing two candidates, one of whom was Leslie Van Rompaey, who had been put forward 
by Uruguay. After having examined the relevant documentation, and conducting an in-person 
interview with the candidate, the Committee raised concerns that the candidate had not himself 
conducted criminal proceedings, and questioned the candidate’s oral proficiency in English.131 
Subsequently, the candidate was withdrawn by Uruguay before votes could be case. This was not 
an isolated incident, with the Advisory Committee raising concerns as to judges’ abilities in 




127 Second Activity Report, supra note 104, 14. 
128 Third Activity Report, supra note 59, 20.  
129 Ibid, 48. 
130 See Report of the Bureau, supra note 85, Annex, C. 12 which states ‘Information and analysis presented by 
the Committee is to inform the decision-making of States Parties and is not in any way binding on them or on 
the Assembly of States Parties.’  
131 Report of the Advisory Committee on Nominations of Judges on the work of its second meeting, The Hague, 
20-28 November 2013, ICC-ASP/12/47, Annex 1, at paras 17 and 18.  
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subsequent years, 132  and as with the Article 255 Panel, no judge ever given a negative 
recommendation by the Advisory Committee has ever gone on to become a judge at the ICC, either 
being withdrawn by their State or losing in the early rounds of elections. 
5. Interim Evaluation 
Ultimately, the crucial question is whether the introduction of IPSIA will in fact serve to address the 
problematic aspects of the current system set out above. In response, it is suggested that the 
introduction of IPSIA would be a step in the right direction in terms of addressing certain important 
issues. For instance, the specific guidance given to the parties to put forward candidates with 
geographical and gender considerations in mind could begin to resolve the current problematic 
issue of a lack of representativeness among decision-makers. Likewise, knowing that the 
individuals they put forward will have to account for their track record of previous appointments, 
affiliations, publications and stated views will act as an extra level of scrutiny informed by 
considerations of the international rule of law and inevitably open up the pool of individuals who 
ultimately become decision-makers.  
Such hopes are not merely utopian, in light of practice in other areas. Aside from the actual 
scrutiny of the application and the interview process itself, there are other positive aspects of 
setting out in clear terms the standards against which candidates will be judged. In contrast to past 
practice, the fact that objective criteria are spelled out provides a degree of transparency that 
should bring greater predictability to the process in the future, and parties should be clearer on 
what IPSIA will value and, it can be hoped, adjust their own thinking when selecting a candidate in 
the first place.133 For instance, one of the most interesting aspects of the introduction of the 255 
Panel has been its knock-on effect on judicial selection processes at the domestic level. As 
Dumbrovsky, Petkova and Van Der Sluis have stated, since the introduction of the Panel, ‘many 
Member States have strengthened the procedural guarantees of screening candidates at the 
national level.’ 134 This form of top-down, knock-on effect on the practice of parties in their 
deliberations over who to put forward could also be a consequence of the institution of the IPSIA. 
Finally, a word of caution; one should not paint too rosy a picture of the potential creation of IPSIA. 
As pointed out above, several difficult procedural hurdles would need to be cleared before it 
became a reality. Even if some sort of consensus for reform of the current system of ISDS was 
found at the multilateral level,135 it is clear that convincing parties to relinquish their current level 
                                                        
132 See, for instance, the concern raised regarding Maria Natércia Gusmão Pereira of Timor-Leste, whose 
proficiency in English the Committee also had concerns about, Mindia Ugrekhelidze of Georgia who the 
Committee raised concerns regarding ‘whether the candidate’s professional experience was of relevance to 
the judicial work of the Court under article 36, paragraph 3(b)(i) of the Rome Statute and consequently 
whether the candidate’s qualifications met all the requirements of the Statute for a judge at the International 
Criminal Court’, and Emmanuel Yaw Benneh of Ghana whose professional experience was also questioned, and 
finally Toma Birmontien of Lithuania, see Report of the Advisory Committee on Nominations of Judges on the 
work of its second meeting, The Hague, 20-28 November 2013, ICC-ASP/12/47, Annex 1. More recently, in 2017 
the Advisory Committee expressed concern with regard to the Mongolian candidate, Chagdaa Khosbayar’s 
proficiency in English, see Report of the Advisory Committee on Nominations of Judges on the work of its sixth 
meeting, New York, 4-14 December 2017, ICC-ASP/16/7, Annex 1. 
133 de Waele, supra note 77, 50; Alter, supra note 78, 127. 
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135 It is perhaps worth mentioning in passing that the need for independent scrutiny of decision-makers would 
not disappear with the creation of a MIC. In fact, in such circumstances it is argued that IPSIA should be 
integrated into the MIC structure, providing independent scrutiny in the same manner as the Article 255 Panel 
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of control over appointments will be an uphill battle. And even if such agreement could be found, 
the absence of a centralised representative or executive body which could appoint members to 
oversee the operation of IPSIA presents a major challenge. This paper proposes a remedial 
solution, but it is in no way perfect. In this vein, we should note that IPSIA would be free from any 
democratic control, and as such its legitimacy could easily be called into question, especially if the 
manner in which it operated fell in any way short in terms of transparency or due process.136 
6. Conclusion 
The central contention of this paper is that, whether or not support is found for the creation of a 
MIC or AB, the introduction of an IPSIA could potentially address some of the current weaknesses in 
the current system of appointments in ISDS. It is suggested that, regardless of the outcome of the 
current multilateral process under the auspices of UNCITRAL, some form of independent scrutiny of 
appointments is an inevitability. As such, it is incumbent upon us to push for the most robust 
reforms possible, and to ensure that independence and impartiality in accordance with the 
international rule of law and representativeness of decision-makers is entrenched in these 
reforms.  
In doing so, transparency must be the guiding principle in order to ensure that IPSIA, or any MIC or 
AB, is seen as legitimate by parties, assuring them that it is not some ‘bloodthirsty secret judicial 
fraternit[y] that, following esoteric and arcane rituals…admits…new acolytes into the ranks of the 
transnational judicial priesthood.’137 If we are to ask parties to make concessions with regard to 
current monopoly on the appointment of arbitrators, it is essential that the transparency and 
ethics of the appointments process under that body must be exemplary, whilst also avoiding any 
suspicion of ‘cronyism and other forms of corruption’ which have mired the current system of 
ISDS.138 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
does for the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Advisory Committee does for the International 
Criminal Court. 
136 Ibid, 457. 
137 Michal Bobek, ‘The Changing Nature of Selection Procedures to the European Courts’, in Michal Bobek, 
Selecting Europe’s Judges (OUP 2015), page 5.  
138 Paulsson, supra note 73, 354. 
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